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"Was the Deal Worth it?": The Dilemma
of States with Ineffective Economic
Incentives Programs
Randle B. Pollard*
Federal subsidies to state and local govermnments have been
substantiallyreduced due to public opinionprioritizing the reduction
of the federal deficit, the recent "fiscal cliff" legislation, and the
federal budget "sequestercuts. "In addition, in many states, revenue
collection from individual and corporate income tax is below prerecession levels. To address the reduction in federal funding and
reduced revenue collections, state and local govermments will
increasingly rely on economic incentive programs to grow their
economies through increased job creation and private capital
investment within their jurisdictions. These economic incentive
programs are no longer comprised of simple tax reductions for
companies seeking expansion or relocation, but include financial
incentives and direct investment programs. The cost of these
incentives, both in expenditures and forgone tax revenue, represents
a growing portion of state and local governments' budgets and may
subject them to steep budget deficits if the incentives do not produce
net economic growth.
Because of the budgetaryrisk and the increasedreliance on these
economic incentives, there is a need for state and local governments
to account for the cost of these incentives and to measure their
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effectiveness. Effective state economic development requires growth
in state economic activity that results in a net increase of revenue in
relation to the cost of the incentives. To measure effectiveness, state
andlocal governmentsmust maintainreliableinformation on the cost
of incentives, -institute mechanisms to limit or cap the costs of
incentives, and hold businesses accountable for performing pursuant
to incentive agreements.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' recession of 2007-2009 significantly reduced
the revenues collected by state and local governments.1 To address
the reduction in federal funding and reduced revenue collections,
state and local governments have increasingly relied on economic
incentive programs to grow their economies through increased job
creation and private capital investment within their jurisdictions.
These economic incentive programs are no longer comprised of
simple tax reductions for companies seeking expansion or relocation,
but include financial incentives and direct investment programs. The
cost of these incentives, both in expenditures and forgone tax
revenue, represents a growing portion of state governments' budgets
and may subject the state to steep budget deficits if the incentives do
not produce net economic growth. Because of the budgetary risk and
the increased reliance on these economic incentives, there is a need
for state and local governments to account for the cost of these
incentives and to measure their effectiveness. State and local
governments should collect more reliable data that is more reflective
of the performance of their economic incentives. In addition, to
control the cost of incentives, state and local governments need to cap
or limit the amount of incentives granted and hold businesses
accountable for receipt of the incentives. Effective state economic
development requires growth in state economic activity that results in
a net increase of revenue in relation to the cost of the incentives. As
discussed infra Section IV of this article, efficient and effective

1. Jean-Marc Lucas, US State and Local Government Finances: from Recession to
Austeriti, CONJONCTURE (BNP Paribas), Apr. 2011, at 3, available at http://s3.amazonaws

.com/zanranstorage/economic-research.bnpparibas.com/ContentPages/

2446749673.pdf.
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incentive programs require reliable data, limits on costs, and
accountability for businesses awarded the incentives.
Section II of this article will describe the history of state
economic programs, the increased use of these programs since the
United States recession of 2007-2009, the categories of economic
programs, and the prevalent programs currently used. Next, Section
III describes challenges to state and local economic incentive
programs; the legality of such programs; the obstacles of measuring
their effectiveness through data collection and methodologies used to
analyze the data; the problems of "failed" incentive programs; and
the fairness of incentive programs to the general public. Finally,
Section IV will conclude with proposals to help states account for
economic incentive programs and prevent the unwanted
consequences of "failed" economic incentive programs.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF STATE ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES
A. HISTORICAL USE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES BY STATES
State and local economic incentive programs have been used by
governments since near the inception of the United States.) Industrial
parks created for developing business near cities were established in
the late eighteenth century.3 In 1791, the New Jersey legislature
created a private corporation for Alexander Hamilton named the
Society for Establishing Useful Manufacturers, to help create
economic development in the state. The New Jersey legislature also
created an area of land solely for the development of business, the
nation's first industrial park. By 1844, Pennsylvania began an
economic development strategy that involved one-hundred million
dollars of public funds invested in private businesses, including the

2. See MICHAEL D. LAFAIVE & MICHAEL J. HICKS, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY,
MEGA: A RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT app. E at 109 (2005), available at http://www.
mackinac.org/archives/2005/s2O005-(P.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see alsoPETER K. EISINGER, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: STATE
AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (Univ. of
Wisconsin Press ed. 1988).
5. LAFAIVE & HICKS, supra note 2.
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development of infrastructure to benefit such businesses.6 In the early
twentieth century and at the beginning of after the Great Depression,
one of the poorest states, Mississippi, created legislation to attract
manufacturing businesses to the state by creating tax-exempt bonds. 7
In 1929, the town of Columbia, Mississippi, assisted the Reliance
Manufacturing Company, a manufacturer of garments, to obtain
collateral from private citizens for a loan to build a new plant in the
city that provided three-hundred new jobs.8 By 1949, Maine created
the first statewide business development corporation. 9 Mississippi's
creation of tax-exempt financing and Maine's creation of a statewide
business development corporation were soon duplicated by other
states. In 1955, New Hampshire created the first state-created entities
to issue state debt and guarantee the debt of private industry, also
known as an industrial finance authority.10 By 1963, forty states had
statewide business development corporations. In the 1970s, counties,
cities, towns, and other government entities had begun economic
development programs. One of the earliest uses of an economic
incentive program by a city was the creation of an Office of Economic
Development by the city of New Haven, Connecticut in 1979.12 In the
twenty-first century and present day, the use of economic incentives is
commonplace among all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and
13
many local governments.

6. Terry F. Buss, The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm
Location Decisions:An Overview of the Literature,15 ECON. DEV. Q. 90, 91 (2001), available
athttp://edq.sagepub.com/content/ 15/1/90.abstract.
7. See Connie Lester, Economic Development in the 1930s: Balance Agriculture nith
Industrv, MISSISSiPPI HISTORY Now (May 2004), http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/
224/economic-development-in-the-1930s-balance-agriculture -with-industry.
8. Lester, supra note 7.
9. See Buss, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See EISINGER, supra note 4, at 17 (Detroit, Chicago, and Minneapolis also expanded or
created economic incentives by the 1980s).
13. See generally Frequently Asked Questions About Economic Development Tax
Incentives, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (June 27, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/newsroom/press-releases/frequently-asked-questions-about-economic-development-tax-incentives-85
899485601.
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B. THE RECESSION AND INCREASED USE OF STATE ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES

By the end of the recession in 2009, state and local governments'
revenues had declined 22.1 percent from the previous year. 14 This
decline was primarily due to a reduction in tax revenue collected from
individual and corporate income taxes. In the second quarter of 2009,
personal income tax revenue dropped by twenty-six percent.1 s Tax
revenue, including revenue from sales tax, personal and corporate
income tax, property tax, and other taxes including inheritance and
estate taxes, and excise taxes, is the primary revenue source for state
and local governments. 16 The next major source of revenue is from
the federal government in the form of grants and subsidies. In 2009,
52.7 percent of local governments' revenue was from taxes,
22.2 percent from federal government support, and 16.1 percent from
fees and charges to industry.1 7 Prior to 2009, the proportion of state
and local government revenue attributed to federal aid averaged
approximately twenty percent, but it was increased during the
recession.' 8 Beginning in 2009, aid from the federal government
accounted for over twenty-four percent of state and local government
due to the actions of the U.S. Congress. 19
Congress enacted legislation to address reduced tax revenue and
provide fiscal relief for states for their participation in funding certain
federal health care programs.2'° The most pivotal legislation enacted
was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009

14. See Lisa M. Blumerman & Jeffrey L. Barnett, The Funding of our State and Local
Governments, RANDOM SAMPLINGS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://blogs.census.gov/2011/10/31/thefunding-of-our-state-and-local-governments/ (The U.S. Census Bureau's 2009 Annual Surveys
of State and Local Government Finances).
15. Lucas, supra note 1. However, sales tax dropped in the same time period by six percent.
16. Id. Seven states do not have a personal income tax-Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New
Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. See 2014 STATE TAX HANDBOOK (Timothy
Bjur et al. eds., 2013). Three states do not have a corporate income tax-Nevada, South Dakota,
and Wyoming. Property taxes are assessed by local governments.
17. Blumerman & Barnett, supra note 14, at 1.
18. Lucas, supra note 1, at 4.
19. Id.
20. See also CHRIS L. PETERSON, CONG. RES. SERVICE, MEDICAID: THE FEDERAL
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP) 2 (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/

documents/health/ MAFMAP.pdf (discussing the federal medical assistance percentages that
are used to determine the matching funds states must provide for certain medical and social
services programs).
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("ARRA"), which provided federal aid to state and local
governments to offset the effects of the recession)1 ' Federal aid
provided through ARRA was meant to assist states for a limited time,
some of which ended in December 2010.22 Federal aid provided
through ARRA decreased from fifty-nine billion dollars in 2011 to six
billion dollars in 2012.2 In addition, since the 2012 Presidential
campaign, federal aid to state and local governments has been
reduced due to public pressure on Congress and the President to
reduce the federal deficit. 4 The Budget Control Act of 2011 had
already set a standard five percent cut to federal spending (the
"Sequester Cuts") that included a reduction of funding to state and
local governments. The Sequester Cuts were delayed two months by
the enactment of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 on
January 2, 2013 (known as the "Fiscal Cliff Act"). 6 The emphasis on
reducing the federal deficit through the Sequester Cuts, along with
the enactment of the Budget Control Act and the Fiscal Cliff Act,
shows a clear trend of reducing federal funding to state and local
governments.
In 2010, after the recession had officially ended, many states still

21. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
155; see also The Recovery Act, RECOVERY.GOV,
http://www.recovery.gov/arra/About/
Pages/TheAct.aspx (last updated May 1, 2014) (website provides details on the Act; $288
billion in tax cuts, $224 billion in extended unemployment benefits, education and health care;
$275 billion for job creation using federal contracts, grants and loans); Recover, HHS.GOV,
http://www.HHS.gov/Recovery (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (ARRA provided approximately
$4.3 billion to states for assistance in FMAP).
22. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TREASURY ANALYSIS OF BUILD AMERICA BONDS
ISSUANCE AND SAVINGS 6 (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/recovery/Documents/BABs 20Report.pdf (discussing the Build America Bond
Program, a taxable bond program used to assist state and local governments in financing capital
projects at lower borrowing costs sunset on December 31, 2010). See also Phil Oliff et al., States
Continue to Feel Recession 's Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 6 (updated
June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf (discussing reduction in federal aid from
fifty-nine billion dollars in 2011 to six billion dollars in 2012).
23. Lucas, supra note 1, at 8. See also Oliff et al., supra note 22, at 7.
24. See generally THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, EVIDENCE COUNTS: EVALUATING
STATE TAX INCENTIVES FOR JOBS AND GROWTH 14 (2012), available at http://www.
pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/economic-mobility/PewF
valuatingStateTaxlncentivesReportpdf.pdf (discussing the study of the increased use of tax
incentives after the recent recession).
25. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, S. 365, 125 Stat. 240.
26. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, H.R. 8, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013)
(addressing the expiring tax provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003).
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had budget shortfalls because revenue from taxes and sources other
than the federal government had not returned to their pre-recession
levels. 7 In 2011, twenty-three states raised taxes and fourteen states
cut their budgets a total of four billion dollars) 8 By 2012, several
states had increased their revenue and had been able to balance their
budgets with spending cuts and tax increases.2 State income and
collected sales tax revenue rebounded in 2012 and 2013. 3o State
budget shortfalls continued but by the end of fiscal year 2013, state
economies had slowly recovered.3 1 Several states have projected
revenue growth for 2014, but the growth remains lower than at prerecession levels.
In light of reduced federal funding, state and local governments
continue to balance their budgets by reducing spending and seeking
alternative revenue sources. States are emphasizing private
investment in economic development within a state through economic
incentive programs. The use of business tax incentives has increased
substantially since the recession ." The use of non-tax economic
incentives, though not a new idea for increasing state and local
revenue, is being expanded and redeveloped by many states to attract
and retain new business. There is an increased reliance by state and
local governments on economic incentive programs to grow their
economies through increased job creation and private capital
investment within their jurisdictions. 33 In 2012, it is estimated that
1,874 state and local governments nationwide spent over eighty
billion dollars in economic incentives.3 4 Since 1999, the number of
27. Oliff et al., supra note 22, at 1. Budget gaps existed for all fifty states for fiscal years
2010 and 2011 and are listed in tables in this report.
28. See Lucas, supra note 1, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Summar: Fall 2013 Fiscal Survei of States, THE NAT'L ASS'N OF ST. BUDGET
OFFICERS, Dec. 14, 2013, available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/Summary
_Fall2020I320Fiscal20Survey20of 20States.pdf.
31. Id.
32. Amy Hamilton, NTA Panelists SaY Recession Accelerated State Use of Business Tax
Incentives, ST. TAx NOTES (TA), May 20, 2013. The article reflects comments made by panelists
at the Eleventh State Local Tax Program sponsored by the National Tax Association and the
American Tax Policy Institute.
33. See Louise Story, FirmsReap Tax Deals for Jobs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 2,
2012, http://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/202/12/02/Firms-reap-tax-deals-for-jobs/stories/
201212020246; Scott M. Susko, In Defense of State Tax Incentives, CFO.cOM (Jan. 7, 2013),
http://ww2.cfo.com/tax/2013/01 in-defense-of-state-tax-incentives/.
34. See Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments PaY High Price,
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economic incentive programs nationwide has doubled.
C. TYPES OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
State economic incentives are essentially programs of state and
local governments designed to increase business investment and job
creation. Most economic incentive programs are focused on four
industries: manufacturing, agriculture, energy, and film. 36 These
incentives are grouped as tax incentives, financial incentives, and
direct investment incentives. 7
1. Tax Incentives
Tax incentives are the reduction, deferral, exemption, or credits
of property, sales and use, personal and corporate income taxes. Tax
incentive programs, authorized and promulgated through state or
local law, ordinance, or rule are designed to attract or retain
businesses by reducing their tax liability in exchange for their
investment in that state for anticipated increased economic growth
and future increased tax revenue. Tax incentives for businesses are
popular among state elected officials who generally believe that
businesses will locate to their state because of tax incentives and
targeted tax cuts to businesses. 38 There is also a common belief among
state policymakers that lowering the tax burden of a business makes a

N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, http://www.nvtimes.com/2OI2/12/(P/us/how-local-taxpayers-bankrollcorporations.html. The article was a part of a three-part series of articles examining subsidies
and economic incentives granted to private business by state and local governments. The New
York Times created a searchable database that was comprised of information from state
governments, Investment Consulting Associates, Good Jobs First's Subsidy Tracker Database,
company financial filings, and Equilar.
35. THE COUNCIL FOR CMTY. AND ECON. RES., 2012 STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INCENTIVES SURVEY REPORT (2013),
available at http://members.c2er.org/download/
2012_EconomicDevelopmentProgramSurveyReport.pdf.
36. See Story, supra note 34, at 3.
37. JOHN E. SILVA ET AL., WELLS FARGO SEC. & REs., THE STATE OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES (2011), available at http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/pdf
/StateEconoiclncentives.pdf (discussing all three types of incentives).
38. Soledad Artiz Prillaman & Kenneth J. Meier, Taxes, Incentives, and Economic Growth.
Assessing the Impact of Pro-Business Taxes on U.S. State Economies, 76 S. POL. SCI. ASS'N J.
POL. 364, 364-79 (2014) (addressing the National Meeting of the American Political Science
Association (Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2012, New Orleans, Louisiana)).

Winter 2015

WAS THE DEAL WORTH IT'?

state more attractive for business expansion and job creation.39
However, few empirical studies have documented the relationship
between low taxes as an incentive for a business to relocate or expand
in a state.40 Regardless of empirical support, tax incentives remain an
important part of many states' economic incentive packages.4
Billions are spent by states every year on tax incentives, and
every state has at least one tax incentive program in the form of tax
credits, exemptions, or deductions>-' Tax credits are a direct reduction
of businesses' tax liability in income, sales and use, property, or other
business taxes. These credits may be granted for investments in
equipment and machinery; 43 economic development within a targeted
area; 44 job creation and hiring of employees in specific areas and
salary levels; 4 use of alternative or renewable energy; 46 and research
and development activities. 47 Exemptions and deductions typically
exclude or reduce income generated from specific business activities
encouraged by the state such as the acquisition of land or
expenditures and are commonly in the form of tax exemptions for
raw materials, sales and use taxes, and inventory taxes. 48 A popular
type of exemption is a temporary exclusion from property tax
liability, also known as property tax abatement. 49 A government
entity, generally a municipality or county, offers to "abate" or delay
39. Prillaman & Meier, supra note 38, at 368.
40. Id. (providing a recent empirical study, using data from fifty U.S. states from 1977 to
2005, examining the impact of state business taxes on the economy of a state).
41. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supranote 24.
42. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 24, at 6.
43. See Investment Credit,BLOOMBERG BNA, ST. TAX PORTFOLIOS: Bus. CREDITS AND
INCENTIVES, available at Portfolio 1450-2nd: 1450.02.A (describing state credits for businesses
investing in tangible personal property essential to their business).
44. See Targeted Economic Development Area Credit, BLOOMBERG BNA, ST. TAX
PORTFOLIOS: BUS. CREDITS AND INCENTIVES, available at Portfolio 1450-2nd: 1450.02.F
(describing the use of this type of credit in 35 states).
45. See Job Credit, BLOOMBERG BNA, ST. TAX PORTFOLIOS: BUS. CREDITS AND
INCENTIVES, availableatPortfolio 1450-2nd: 1450.02. B.

46. See Enerzy Cre&t, BLOOMBERG BNA, ST. TAX PORTFOLIOS: BUS. CREDITS AND
INCENTIVES, available atPortfolio 1450-2nd: 1450.(P-.D.
47. See Research and Development Cre&ts, BLOOMBERG BNA, ST. TAX PORTFOLIOS:
BUS. CREDITS AND INCENTIVES, available at Portfolio 1450-2nd: 1450.02.C. (states generally
model their credit after the federal research and development credit in I.R.C. § 41 (1986)).

48. See

State

Incentive

Programs,

SITE

SELECTION

(Nov.

2010),

http://www.siteselection.com/issues/2010/nov/upload/101IncentiveChartswNotes.pdf.
49. See STEVEN G. KOvAN & THOMAS S. LYONS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WHAT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Do (IMCA Publications 2006). Many local governments nationwide
use property tax abatements for economic incentives.
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the collection of property tax on new real and personal property for a
certain period of time, in exchange for a business investment project
in its jurisdiction. 0 The abatement is attractive to the business
because it reduces their tax liability for a certain period of time,
usually in the project's first years of operation in the jurisdiction. The
government entity makes a determination that projected revenue in
the form of property tax, local income tax, and other economic
benefits such as job creation generated by the project are well worth
the temporary abatement of property tax. Typically, the business
must report the progress of the project annually to the government
entity. Once the project is complete, meaning the real property is
ready for its intended business use or the personal property such as
equipment is acquired and installed, the business must notify the
government entity and the abatement period begins.
2. FinancialIncentives
Financial incentives provide economic value to a business
without a reduction of tax liability. 1 These incentives may be grants
and other nonrecourse revenue, direct or subsidized loans, financing
funded by tax revenue generated from a particular geographic area,
known as tax increment financing ("TIF"), municipal bond financing,
public utilities reduction, and infrastructure improvements.s5 Grants
and other nonrecourse revenue are simply funds from state or local
government or quasi-government entities given directly to private
businesses while direct and subsidized loans provide private
businesses with loans at interest rates at or below market rates. TIF
uses the anticipated future tax revenue generated by new private
business development within a specific geographic area for economic

50. See, e.., ALA. CODE § 40-9B-4 (2014) (abatement for non-educational real and
personal property taxes assessed and not previously placed in service, for a private business
conducting manufacturing, warehousing or research); see also IC § 6-1.1-12 (2010) (abatement
of new real property improvements or new personal property such as manufacturing equipment
research and development equipment for maximum of ten years granted by a local government
to a privately owned business).
51. SILVA ET AL., supra note 37, at 2.
52. See, e.., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-437.01 and § 143B-437.04 (2014) (North Carolina's
statute authorizing local governments to grant financial incentives in the form of grants and
development funding).
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development. 3 A state or local government designates a specific
geographic area for economic development known as a TIF district.
The TIF district typically is a geographic area that suffers from
economic blight or an area that lacks significant private investment. 4
The tax revenue from property or sales taxes collected before any
development occurs in the TIF district is the base rate of tax revenue.
As an enticement to locate in the TIF district, private businesses are
offered financial incentives financed by the increased property or
sales tax revenue, known as a tax increment, resulting from the
economic development. ss The financial incentive financed by TIF
funds may include infrastructure improvements and the repayment of
municipal debt used to fund the development within the TIF district.5 6
Probably the most common financial incentive is loaning the
proceeds of the sale of state and local debt known as municipal
bonds. s7 The interest earned on the bonds is excluded from gross
income of the bondholder. s The federal tax exemption reduces the
cost of borrowing money for state and local governments because it
increases the after-tax yield on the bonds, allowing state and local
bond issuers to pay lower interest rates to bondholders s9 State and
local governments may transfer the benefits of the lower interest rates
in the form of a loan to private businesses through bonds called
revenue bonds. 60 The revenues used to secure the bonds are
generated from the activity or project financed by the bonds. 6 The
proceeds from the sale of the bonds are used to help private
businesses finance the purchase of supplies, equipment, and land, as
53. See generally Tax Increment Financing, GOOD
JOBS
FIRST
(2010),
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/accountable-development/tax-increment-financing.
54. See ALYSSA TALANKER ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, STRAYING FROM GOOD
INTENTIONS:

How STATES

ARE WEAKENING

ENTERPRISE ZONE

AND TAX INCREMENT

available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/
files/docs/pdf/straying.pdf. However, the Good Jobs First organization has cited a trend of state
and local governments designating geographic areas that are non-blighted and affluent areas.
FINANCING

PROGRAMS

1

(2003),

55. TALANKER ET AL., supra note 54.
56. See SYLVAN G. FELDSTEIN & FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL

BONDS 1296 (Wiley, 1st ed. 2008) (defining a tax increment bond).
57. See generalli id. (general description of how municipal bonds are used and issued by
state and local governments).
58. 26 U.S.C.A § 103 (West 1986).
59. JUDY WESALO TEMEL, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 27-29 (5th ed.
2001).
60. See id. at 33.
61. See FELDSTEIN & FABOZZI, supra note 56, at 809.
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62
well as the cost of construction of improvements.
Finally, there are financial incentives that help reduce operating
costs of private businesses. These incentives include reduced public
utility rates, and direct expenditures by state and local governments
by providing private businesses with free land, buildings, exemptions
from local and state regulations, and other customized services for
agreeing to develop or relocate their operations to a specific area. 63
State and local governments do not reduce tax revenue by using
these incentives, but they incur risk of the loss for a poor investment
of their financial incentives.64 Grant and loan funds could be wasted if
economic development promised by private businesses is not
accomplished. State and local governments are burdened with an
obligation to repay debt created by a TIF or municipal bond issuance
if a business fails to repay the obligation. Moreover, state and local
governments may have to repay utility companies for a public utility
reduction or public funds used for infrastructure improvements.

3. DirectInvestment Incentives
State and local governments with direct investment incentive
programs use public funds to make equity investments into privately
owned businesses.65 Quintessentially, state and local governments
become owners of a private business.66 The risk is inherent because
there is a direct relationship with the success of the business and the
state and local government receiving a return on their investment.67
62. See FELDSTEIN & FABOZZI, supra note 56, at 809.
63. See Lauren Murphree, A Iindoif of Opportunitv: WhY Texas is in the Best Position to
Develop Offshore ltndEnergki- 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 73, 77 (2013) (discussing Texas' use of
financial incentives in its efforts to lead the renewable energy market for offshore wind energy);
see alsoRobert A. Reiley, FinancialIncentives and the Leadership Role Taken b PennsvIvania
and OtherStates to Bring Green Eneri to the Free larket, 18 WIDENER L.J. 897, 909 (2009)
(discussing incentives adopted by Pennsylvania including its financial incentives to the green
energy market and the impact these program and funding sources have had).
64. See infra Section III (a "poor investment" equating to a failed incentive program is
discussed in more detail).
65. SILVA ET AL., supra note 37, at 4.
66. See

Programs

and

Services,

BEN

FRANKLIN

TECHNOLOGY

PARTNERS,

http://benfranklin.org/programs-services (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (the Advanced Technology
Centers of the Ben Franklin Partnership in Pennsylvania is a state-sponsored direct investment
program in technology businesses that began in 1983).
67. In some circumstances it may be reasonable for state and local governments to risk
potential loss for the sake of enabling a private business that but for the government investment

Winter 2015

D.

WAS THE DEAL WORTH IT'?

GOALS OF ECONOMIC DLVELOPMENT

The primary goal of state economic development appears
obvious- attract or retain business to increase capital investment and
job creation to ultimately increase tax revenue. This increased
revenue then becomes available for use in the state's overall budget.
However, is the goal of the state to increase the number of jobs for its
residents or to increase the per capita income of its residents?68 Critics
of state economic development programs frequently state that mere
job creation of an incentive program does not justify the effectiveness
and economic worth of the program.69 Advocacy groups such as Good
Jobs First, a national advocacy group promoting more effective and
accountable economic incentive programs, monitor state economic
development programs nationwide and provide the public and
government officials with data and resources to help these programs
be more accountable and effective.70 Good Jobs First and other
thought leaders on state economic development believe states should
not look to the quantity of the jobs created but the quality-whether
the jobs are increasing the per capita income of the residents of the
state.71

would not be developed. This article does not examine the criteria for a government to make
such a risk assessment.
68. See, e.g., Timothy J. Bartik, What Should Mlichigan Be Doing to Promote Long-Run
Economic Development? I (W.E. Upjohn Inst. for Emp. Res., Working Paper No. 09-160,
2009), available at http://research.upjohn.org/up-xworkingpapers/160 (discussing the state of
Michigan's goal of economic development).
69. See generally GOOD JOBS FIRST, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org (last visited Oct. 19,
2014) (describing Good Jobs First's purposes and activities); see also Timothy J. Bartik, Senior
Economist, Estimating the Costs per Job Created of Employer Subsidy Programs, Presentation
at Upjohn Institute Conference on Labor Markets in Recession and Recovery (Oct. 22-23,
2010) (discussing the need for state job-creation policies that are more cost effective); THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AVOIDING BLANK CHECKS: CREATING FISCALLY SOUND STATE TAX

INCENTIVES

(2012),

available

at

http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCSAssets/

2012/Pew tax incentives report.pdf (providing an overview of how unexpected costs of state
economic incentive programs, including job creation programs, can negatively impact state
budgets); Peter Fisher & Alan Peters, The Failuresof EconomicDevelopment Incentives, 70 J.

OF

THE

AM.

PLAN.

ASS'N

27,

32

(2004),

available at https://www.mackinac.org/

archives/2009/nr043009-petersfisher.pdf (stating on average state economic development
incentives create an average of one in ten new jobs).
70. See generally GOOD JOBS FIRST, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org (last visited Oct. 19,

2014).
71. Id.; see, e.g.. Robert C. Dauffenbach & Larkin Warner, Oklahomas Ad Valorem Tax
Exemptions and the 2ualiti Jobs Act, in STATE POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
OKLAHOMA 13-27 (Oklahoma 21st Century, Inc., 2004); Dan Gorin, State Economic Growth
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III. CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
A. LEGAL CHALLENGES
State and local economic incentives have been challenged on
state constitutional and federal constitutional grounds. On the state
level, petitioners have unsuccessfully argued that economic incentives
to private businesses did not serve a public purpose and thus violated
the state constitution. 72 On state constitutional grounds, state and
local economic incentives are constitutional and remain enforceable if
they serve a public purpose. 73 The federal claim has been that state
and local economic incentives violated the "dormant" or "negative"
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states
from discriminating against interstate commerce.74 The primary
argument is that state and local incentives discriminate against out-ofstate economic activities or interstate enterprises. 75 This was the
essential claim by a taxpayer in DaimlerChryslerCorp. v. Cuno.76 In
Cuno, a taxpayer claimed economic incentives, an investment tax
credit, given to the car manufacturer to locate to the state violated the
Commerce Clause.77 The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case on
procedural grounds, stating the taxpayer did not have standing to sue
and thus did not address the substantive issue.78

Incentives and the Oklahoma QualityJobsProgram, I OKLA. POLY STUD. REV. 1, 7-12 (2000).
72. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 727 (1996) (North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld twenty-four economic development incentive projects as constitutional because
they were directly aimed at furthering the general economic welfare); see also Jeanette K.
Doran, The People versus Corporate Welfare: North Carolina's Forsaken Opportunity to
Reverse Perversionof the Commerce Clause and to Reinvigorate the PublicPurpose Doctrine,
33 CAMPBELL L. REv. 381, 403 (2000).
73. Id.
74. The analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause is beyond scope of this Article.
Congress has the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States . . . with the implication that states cannot discriminate against or unduly burden
interstate commerce." U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
75. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints
on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377, 382 (1996) (providing a detailed
analysis of Commerce Clause challenges to the use of state tax incentives).
76. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 332 (2006).
77. See S. Mohsin Reza, DaimlerChrisler v. Cuno: An Escape From The Dormant
Commerce Clause Quagmire?, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1229 (2006) (discussing whether the
granting of an investment tax credit to a taxpayer based on whether the taxpayer installed new
equipment in the state violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
78. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 322.
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B. EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
1. Measuring Fffectiveness
Assessing the effectiveness of incentive programs is difficult
because there are so many different ways to measure the
effectiveness.79 Statistical models have been used to measure the
growth due to incentive programs, which measure certain factors such
as changes in employment, personal income, gross state and local
product, and formation of new companies.80 However, these factors
may not truly reflect effectiveness without accounting for the time
period in which the incentives are measured and the impact of
business cycle fluctuations in the economy.81 Some indeterminate
factors of measuring incentive programs include: time period used;
tracking of data state; rationale for lack of data; and determining if
results of incentives are attributed to the incentive or the economic
climate. ' Economic growth may only be maintained for a specific
period of time before outside economic factors may cause a downturn
in economic growth. An increase in jobs or an increase of personal
income may be due to other economic factors such as tourism or
economic growth in a specific industry that are not associated with or
a direct result of the incentive program. For these reasons, it is
important to determine a specific period of time to measure
effectiveness and to account for outside economic factors.
Scholars in economics and tax, relocation consultants,
government officials, and economic public policy organizations have
not agreed on a sole standard to determine the overall effects of state
economic incentives on the general economic growth of a state or
local government.83 However, most economists, consultants, and
government and public policy officials will agree that data collected
and relied on is the beginning of the process of evaluating an
incentive program. In a 2012 State Economic Development Incentives
Survey Report (the "Survey Report") conducted by the Council for

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See SILVA ET AL., supra note 37, at 5.
Id
Id. at 6.
Id.
See generallrFisher & Peters supra note 69.
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Community and Economic Research, state and local government
agencies that administered economic incentive programs were asked
how economic incentive programs were evaluated. 4 The Survey
Report separated non-tax and tax incentive programs and indicated
that seventy percent of the responding state agencies collect
quantified program information or performance data occasionally or
on a regular basis. From 1999-2012, the collection of data for
evaluation of programs increased by almost nine percent.85 Factors
used by state agencies to evaluate the performance of incentives
included: number of jobs created; number of jobs retained;
investment made by company assisted; average wages paid; increased
or new sales; tax revenues generated; and value of cost savings for
business. For both tax and non-tax programs, the most common
factor used to evaluate the outcome of a program was the number of
jobs created, used for sixty-one percent of non-tax programs and 31.9
percent of tax programs. 6 Other key factors included number of jobs
retained, investments made by company assisted, and average wages
paid. 87
Once data is collected, a method for conducting a quantitative
analysis is needed to complete the evaluation. The Survey Report
determined that state agencies used the following methods to analyze
their data: Economic Impact Analysis, Return on Investment
Analysis, Ratio of "Public Benefit" Analysis, and Net Fiscal Impacts
Analysis. 88 A substantial percentage of the state agencies did not
analyze the data collected (17.8 percent) or used another
methodology (4.1 percent). The most used methodology was the
Economic Impact Analysis at 60.6 percent, followed by the Return on
Investment at 16.2 percent, Ratio of "Public Benefit" Analysis at 11.6
percent, and Net Fiscal Impacts Analysis at 10.4 percent.89 Each
methodology focuses on different factors to evaluate effectiveness.

84. See COUNCIL FOR CMTY. & ECON. RESEARCH, supra note 35. The survey included 576
tax incentive programs and 696 non-tax incentive programs. The response rate for both tax and
non-tax programs was 29.7 percent.
85. Id. at 20-21.
86. See id. at 21, Figure 26.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 27.
89. Id. The percentage of use of methodologies differed between the non-tax and tax
programs. See id. at 28, Figure 32.

Winter 2015

WAS THE DEAL WORTH IT'?

a. Economic Impact Analysis
The economic impact analysis estimates how economic activity is
affected by a new business locating in that community. 90 For instance,
a new business locating to a community will have various economic
effects on that community through its direct spending to build or
lease new facilities, the hiring personnel, and the purchasing of
supplies and equipment to operate the business. These expenditures
are easily tabulated and recorded as direct effects on the local
community. However, these direct expenditures may cause a chain
reaction of other economic effects on the community and broader
regional economy. 91 For example, the direct spending on goods and
services from local vendors and suppliers may cause them to hire
more workers. The salaries of those new workers will be used on local
goods and services and help expand the local and regional economies.
Thus, the total economic impact of the one new business can be
measured in layers.9 An economic impact analysis accounts for the
effects on three different levels: direct effects, indirect effects, and
induced effects. 93 The direct effects are the changes to employment
and income that are the result of the initial spending of the new
business or economic development project. The spending of suppliers,
vendors and manufacturers that provides goods and services essential
to the new business' or project's operations makes up the indirect
effects. 94 Lastly, induced effects on the economy are the changes in
and spending of the wages and salaries of the direct and indirect
employees on goods and services for common household expenses
such as food, housing, transportation, and medical services. 9'
Together, the indirect and induced impacts create a "ripple effect" of
economic activity that results from the initial direct expenditures. 96
The additional impacts are estimated by "multipliers" -a numerical

90. See generally Jonathan Q. Morgan, Analfzing the Benefits and Costs of Economic
Development Projects,CMTY. & ECON. DEv. BULL. (Univ. of N.C., Sch. of Gov't), April 2010.
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.; see also PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 24, at 19.
95. See Morgan, supra note 90, at 3.
96. Id.

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 11:1

factor by which the value of the direct effects is multiplied.97 These
multipliers vary by industry and provide a simplistic estimate of the
total increase in employment, economic output per each job created
or per each dollar increase in the earnings of business sales in the
local and regional community. 98 More sophisticated input/output
estimates are made through impact model and software applications.99
b. Other Methodologies
The other three methodologies -Return on Investment, Ratio of
"Public Benefit" Analysis, and the Fiscal Impact Analysis-are more
simplistic analyses than the Economic Impact Analysis. Each is the
process of comparing the costs, in the form of tax concessions and
revenue outlays, to the revenues that have been generated by the
economic development project. 00 The forgone tax revenue and
infrastructure improvement costs are compared with the revenue
returns due to job creation and other sources of state income.0 1 The
fiscal impact analysis may provide a more detailed prediction of the
net financial impact on the jurisdiction where the development
2

occurs.10

2. "Failed'Economic Incentive Programs
Whether an incentive program is successful or unsuccessful will
depend on the data relied upon and the methodology used to
evaluate the program. If the goals are not met, has the incentive
program failed'? There are numerous examples of incentive programs

97. See Morgan, supra note 90, at 3.
98. Id.
99. The most commonly used modeling software includes the Regional Input-Output
Modeling System ("RIMS II"), Impact Analysis For Planning ("IMPLAN"), and Regional
Economic Models Inc. ("REMI"). Id.This Article is not attempting to provide an economic
analysis of which methodology is the best in measuring net financial impact.
100. Id.; see also SILVA ET AL., supra note 37, at 6.
101. Id.The fiscal impact analysis focuses on the net effect of the project on the state or local
budget. The forgone tax revenue and infrastructure improvement costs are compared with the
revenue returns due to job creation and other sources of state income.
102. See MICHAEL J. MUCHA, GOV'T FIN. OFFICERS ASS'N, AN INTRODUCTION TO FISCAL
IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (2007), available at http://www.gfoa.org/

downloads/FinanicalImpact Analysis.pdf.
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throughout the country that did not meet the projected goals
promised by private business. 0 3 To better illustrate examples of failed
incentive programs, this article focuses on two states with significant
highly publicized failed incentive programs.
a. Florida
The state of Florida, through Enterprise Florida, Inc., its publicprivate economic development organization, has invested over $1.7
billion in incentives in 1,600 job creation programs since 1995.104
Collectively, private companies receiving these incentives promised to
generate 224,000 jobs, yet only 80,000 jobs were created. 05 The
Florida Department of Economic Opportunity ("DEO") was created
in the fall of 2011 to help monitor state incentive programs and
recover money from businesses that failed to produce promised
jobs. 10 6 The DEO created a database listing more than 1,500 subsidy
deals dating back to 1995.07 Most incentives granted by the state are
paid to companies with after-tax credits; however, some incentives are
paid up front to companies from a Quick Action Closing Fund.1°8 This
fund is meant to provide companies with upfront cash to encourage
them to locate or expand in Florida. Seven companies that were
granted over twenty-three million dollars from the Quick Action
Closing Fund failed to meet their promised job creation goals.10 9 One
of the seven companies was Redpine Healthcare Technologies, a
company that developed cloud-based software to help chiropractors
manage their billing systems. Redpine received $750,000 from the

103. See PEW CTR.ON THE STATES, supra note 24.

104. Beth Kassab, Public Aloner Doesn't Guarantee Jobs, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Oct.
30,
2011,
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-10-30/business/os-cfb-kassab-j obincentives-20111030_lnew-j obs-tax-incentives-gray-swoope.
105. Id.

106. Aaron Deslatte, Florida Gave $Z5,00 Tax Deal to Compani That Rent Bankrupt,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 7, 2012, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com!2012-0307/news/os-state-wants-economic-development-money-back-20120307-1-economic-incentivesprograqm-gray-swoope-incentive-deals.
107. See Database:FloridaBusiness Incentives, ORLANDO SENTINAL, http://databases.sunsentinel.com/Orlando/ftlaudosincentives/ftlaudBusinesslnventives list.php.
108. FLA STAT. § 288.1088 (2014); see also State of Florida Job Creation Plan,
FLORIDAJOBS.COM,
http://www.floridajobs.org/docs/business-resources/state of floridajobcreation plan.pdf (a description of Florida's economic incentive programs).
109. Dauffenbach & Warner, supra note 71.
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Quick Action Closing Fund and $1.6 million in other incentives to
relocate from Spokane, Washington, to Panama City, Florida.
Redpine committed to create a minimum of 123 jobs with an average
salary of $49,155 by the end of 2012. Five months after Redpine
relocated to Panama City, the company went bankrupt. The Florida
Attorney General has filed a lawsuit to recover the money, and the
litigation is ongoing.110 Florida governor Rick Scott disputes the
characterization by Florida newspapers that the DEO is not fully
disclosing the state's economic incentives and that it is not enforcing
the incentive agreements.
b. North Carolina
In 2005, to lure Dell, Inc. from the state of Texas, the state of
North Carolina offered Dell, Inc. an economic incentive package
totaling approximately $260 million. The incentive package was the
largeset granted to date and consisted of $243 million in tax breaks on
corporate income and state franchise taxes."' Tax breaks were based
on the number of jobs to be created. Incentives also included a $14.1
million Job Development Investment Grant and a $2.8 million grant
from Golden LEAF Foundation to Forsyth Technical Community
College for a Dell Training Initiative for job training associated with
the new facility.1 1 In October 2009, Dell announced it was closing its
facility in Winston-Salem, laying off more than nine hundred
11 3
employees.
110. Chris Olwell, Lawsuit Claims Redpine Exec AlisusedFunds,THE NEWS HERALD, Nov.
9, 2012, http://www.newsherald.com/news/business/lawsuit-claims-redpine-exec-misused-fundsdocuments-1.47373; Amended Complaint, State of Florida, Dept. of Economic Opportunity v.
Redpine Health Care Technologies, Inc., No. 2012CA 000645 (June 2013).
111. Brian Balfour, Top Ten North Carolina Economic Incentive Deals, CIVITAS
INSTITUTE (Jan. 25, 2010), https://www.nccivitas.org/2010/top-ten-north-carolina-economicincentive-deals/#_edn3.
112. The incentives were part of the Economic Development Partnership of North Carolina,
a non profit corporation that led the state's efforts to attract and retain businesses. See generally
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH CAROLINA, http://www.edpnc.com/ (last

visited Oct. 23, 2014). The Job Development Grant, which is part of the state's economic
development program, is a discretionary grant given to new businesses. See Job Development
Grants,
THRIVE
IN
NORTH
CAROLINA,
http://www.thrivenc.com/incentives/

financialdiscretionary-programs/job-development-investment-grant (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
The Golden Leaf Foundation is a non profit entity providing funding for job training in North
Carolina. See THE GOLDEN LEAF, http://www.goldenleaf.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
113. Adam Owens, Dell to close NC. plant, Eliminate 905 Jobs, WRAL, Oct. 8, 2009,
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3. Recourse for FailedEconomic Incentive Programs
State and local governments have recourse against businesses
that received economic incentives but did not produce the promised
economic results. The state and local government can seek the
reimbursement of the incentives based on repayment or "clawback"
provisions in the agreement with the business.1 1 4 The forgone tax
revenue resulting from the granting of tax incentives by the state and
local government is lost unless the agreement provides that the
business pay for the forgone tax revenue. With financial or direct
investment incentives, provisions in the agreement may require the
business to pay back all the funds it received.15 In order to enforce
the promises made by a business, there must be a contractual
agreement. Statements made by a business in its solicitations and
negotiations for economic incentives are not considered enforceable
promises. The process of distinguishing mere statements and
enforceable promises was addressed in the case of Ypsilanti
Township v. General Motors Corporation ("GM").1 6 The town of
Ypsilanti, Michigan, had granted GM several million dollars of
personal property tax abatement in 1984 and 1988 for the expansion
of its manufacturing plant in the town. 1 7 Ypsilanti claimed GM
breached its agreement with the town when it announced in
December 1991 that it was closing the plant and moving its operations
to Arlington, Texas. 8 Ypsilanti's lawsuit alleged that GM breached a

available at http://www.wral.com/business/story/6156112/; Nanette Byrnes, Dell's Plant Closure
Raises Anger Over Incentives, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/careers/managementiq/archives/2009/ 10/dells-Plant-closure-raise
s anger over incentives.html.
114. See generallyPEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 24.
115. See Ben Weisfuse, Sealing the Deal: WhY states are incorporatingdeal closing funds
into economic development strateg;. SITE SELECTION (May 10, 2012), http://, ww.
siteselection.com/onlinelnsider/sealing-the-deal.cfm (This article describes the use discretionary
cash grants, usually ranging from several hundred thousand to ten million dollars, given to
business up front to make businesses commit to expansion or relocation in the state. Twentythree states currently use these types of incentives).
116. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 557 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993).
117. Id. at 558. GM was granted a twelve-year fifty percent personal property tax abatement
at its Willow Run facility in Ypsilanti on its 1984 planned investment of $175 million and its
1988 planned investment of seventy-five million dollars.
118. Id. GM claimed that moving the facility to Arlington, Texas to consolidate the
production of its Chevrolet Caprice was necessary due to record losses on sales of the car.
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contract created by the state tax abatement statute and based on its
conduct, unjust enrichment, misrepresentation, and promissory
estoppel.119 The Washtenaw County Circuit Court ruled that the
abatement state statute and application for abatement did not create
a contractt'20 However, the court ruled in favor of Ypsilanti on the
grounds that GM had made a promise to continue production at the
Willow Run plant and was bound to the promise by promissory
estoppel.' 1 Based on the ruling, GM was enjoined from moving the
plant to Texas. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court's ruling that GM was obligated to maintain the plant
in Ypsilanti under the theory of promissory estoppel'2 The Court of
Appeals held that GM's statements of continuing use of the plant in
obtaining the tax abatement were not promises and such statements
were required in the tax abatement application process.1 3 In addition,
even if there had been a promise created by such statements, reliance
on them was unreasonable.' 4 The Ypsilanti case encouraged state
and local governments to create enforceable and binding contracts
with businesses requiring business to remain in the jurisdiction for a
certain specified time period. -'
C. EFFICIENCY OF INCENTIVE PROGRAMS

To attract businesses to their jurisdictions, state and local
governments may find that they are competing with several other
jurisdictions. Some critics claim that competition results in an
economic war among the states where there is a "'zero-sum game'-

119. Charter Tp., 506 N.W.2d at 557.
120. Id.
121. Id. The town claimed that the statements by GM's plant manager at a public hearing
constituted a promise to produce the Caprice automobile at the Willow Run facility on the
approval of the abatements.
122. Id. at 559. The Court of Appeals refers to the elements of promissory estoppel, [a]
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promise." (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981)).
123. Charter Tp., 506 N.W.2d at 560. Receiving the tax abatement required that a business
make representations of job creation as required by state statute.
124. Id. at 559-61. The Court of Appeals also noted that there was no evidence that the
Ypsilanti Township board approval of the tax abatement was conditioned on a commitment by
GM to stay in the town for a specific period of time.
125. Krystal Miller & Edward Felsenthal, GI Can 't be Forced Into Keeping Plant Open,
Appeals CourtSais WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1993.
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one jurisdiction gains at the loss of another., 12 6 Nationally, this
competition does not produce a net economic gain because capital is
relocating from one state to another.' 7 The competition has also
caused an increase in the cost of incentives used to attract business,
resulting in less tax revenue, which may affect a jurisdiction's tax base
and education and infrastructure funding.' 8 Businesses also help
increase the cost of incentives by causing costly "bidding wars"
between and among states to obtain the most favorable deals.>' Some
businesses threaten to relocate in order to receive retention
incentives to stay in the state, increasing the cost of incentives in that
state. 130
Another problem caused by the increased competition among
the states is interstate job fraud -the "shell game" of treating existing
jobs of a newly relocated business as "new jobs., 131 An example of the
job "shell game" is the 2012 relocation of the company Freightquote
1
from Lenexa, Kansas twelve miles away to Kansas City, Missouri. 3
The relocation of 1,225 jobs did not add jobs to the metro Kansas City
area, but cost the state and local governments in Missouri $64.3
million in incentives. 133 Recent studies in Minnesota and Nebraska
134
show that job growth would occur without the help of incentives.
Overall, the economic war among the states has increased the cost of
incentives and called into question the efficiency of incentives.

126. Jonathan

Q.Morgan,

Using Economic Development Incentives: For Better or for

gorse, 70 POPULAR GOVT 23 n. 2 (2009).
127. Id.at 23.
128. Greg LeRoy et al., The Job-Creation Shell Game: En&ig the Wasteful Practice of
Subsi&zing Companies that Mlove Jobs From One State to Another, GOOD JOBS FIRST (Jan.
2013), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/shellgame.pdf.
129. Gorin, supra note 71.
130. LeRoy et al., supra note 128, at i.
131. Id.
132. Karen Mracek, States Reviving Incentives for Firms to Relocate, KIPLINGER (Apr. 1,
2013), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/business/TO 9-C2 I-SO05-state-economic-developmentincentives.html.
133. Id.
134. Id. In Minnesota, eighty percent of jobs created by companies receiving state
employment incentives would have occurred without the incentives. The Nebraska report stated
that each job created through its job incentive program cost $235,000. Id.
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IV. MORE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE OF
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
A. RELIABLE DATA ON INCENTIVES
A common barrier to the collection of data is the reluctance of
state policymakers to review the effectiveness of incentive programs
for political reasons.135 In several states, data on incentive programs is
nonexistent. 136 Without accurate and measurable data on past
incentives, state and local officials cannot make informed decisions on
future incentive programs.1 37 The need for accurate data collection
and public disclosure of data on state economic incentives is not a
recent development. On May 21-22, 1996, the Minnesota Public
Radio's Civic Journalism Initiative held "The Economic War Among
the States" conference at the National Academy of Sciences in
Washington D.C.1 38 The conference, attended by economists, lawyers,
state legislators, policymakers, tax administrators, and business
leaders, addressed several issues including the need for state
governments and their agencies to more accurately report the costs
and benefits of economic incentives and provide better disclosure of
this information to the public. Policy groups such as Good Jobs First
encourage states to make information on incentives more transparent
and readily available to the public.
There is no national database to account and access state and
local incentive programs. However, in a 2012 New York Times series
of articles on state and local government economic incentives,
columnists Louse Story, Tiff Fehr, and Derek Watkins created a
database of state and local economic incentives by using multiple
sources that included: research of government agency reports;
financial reporting of individual companies; data from Good Jobs
First and the Investment Consulting Associates; and budgetary
information from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the

135. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 69, at 7.
136. Id.
137. See SILVA ET AL., supra note 37, at 7.
138. See Chris Farrell, The Economic War Among the States: An Overview, THE REGION,
June 1, 1996, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications-papers/pub-display
.cfm?id-3659.
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National Association of State Budget Officers. 139 The database
reviewed 1,874 incentive programs nationwide. 140 Last January, Good
Jobs First produced a study reviewing the online reporting of
incentive programs by states. 14 ' The study showed forty-six states and
the District of Columbia provided online disclosure of at least one
major incentive program, an increase from twenty-three that
provided such disclosure in Good Jobs First's similar study in 2007.142
States were rated on data available online that included the name of
the recipient of the incentive, amount of the incentive, the number of
jobs created by the incentive, and the ease of obtaining the
information online-focusing on whether the online disclosure
143
provided transparency of incentive program data to the public.
Overall, states were providing more information about their incentive
programs online. However, four states, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho,
and Kansas, do not make data on their incentive programs available
144
online.
A solution to the data problem is state and local governments
statutorily requiring the collection of economic data and providing
standards for the collection of the data. In the authorization of an
economic incentive program, the state or local government is
required to maintain data on all incentives granted to private
businesses. Support for this mandate could come from the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities and the National Association of State
Budget Officers. The data would be of public record and could be
used in the assessment of the success of an economic incentive.

139. See Story, supra note 34. The Investment Consulting Associates is an association that
assists companies with relocation analysis and incentive negotiation. See also
ICAINCENTIVES.COM, http://www.icaincentives.com/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2014); Subsidy
Tracker 2.0, GOOD JOBS FIRST, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker (last visited Oct.
18,2014).
140. Id. It took the New York Times reporters ten months to collect and tabulate the
database.
141. Philip Mattera et al., Show Us the Subsidized Jobs-An Evaluation of State
Government Online Disclosure of Economic Development Subsidy Awards and Outcomes,
GOOD JOBS FIRST (Jan. 2014), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/showusthesubsidies. The study
reviewed four to five economic development programs in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia. The total cost of the programs was twelve billion dollars annually.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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B. LIMITS ON FUNDING OF INCENTIVES

Government officials tend not to be motivated in accurately
estimating the projected impact of incentive programs when
attempting to pass economic incentive legislation. 14 The emphasis is
on getting the incentive legislation passed and not accurately
estimating the cost of the incentive and its effect on the state and local
budgets. An appropriation of funds to incentives would limit their
cost. Appropriation of funding of economic incentives to state or
local government budgets has not been widely done nationwide.
However, legislators are more frequently setting annual caps to the
146
costs expended for incentives.
C. ACCOUNTABILITY ON BUSINESSES FOR PERFORMANCE

As stated in Section JJJ(b)(3) of this article, states have recourse
against businesses that fail to meet their projected employment or
investment goals. States will frequently include "clawback" or
recapture language in the contractual agreements that provides the
incentives. However, in the case of Quick Action Closing Funds that
provide businesses with upfront money for economic development,
there is a need to curtail or limit the amount of money provided
before the business has begun its expansion or relocation. As in
Florida's failed incentive program with the company Redpine, there is
a risk that upfront money granted may be unrecoverable due to
embezzlement, fraud, or an insolvent or bankrupt company.1 47 To
avoid this risk, state and local governments should monitor the
incentive programs annually rather than wait until a project is
completed, which may be over a several-year period. A state could
avoid clawback enforcement by basing the amount of incentives
granted on the amount of employment and earnings achieved by the
business within the first two to three years.1 48 In addition, state and

145. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 69, at 7.
146. Id. at 14. In 2012, Minnesota's Small Business Investment Tax Credit was capped at
twelve million dollars per calendar year. Massachusetts' Life Sciences Center tax incentives
program has a twenty-five million dollars-a-year cap. Id.
147. See Dauffenbach & Warner, supra note 71; see also Bartik, supra note 68, at 9-10.
148. Bartik, supra note 69, at 12.
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local governments conducting more rigorous cost-benefit analysis
before granting the incentives would avoid the clawback issue all
together.149 In addition to the recourse of retrieving allocated or
granted incentive funds, state and local governments should consider
creating accountability standards for recipients of incentives. The
state could create accountability standards as a part of its statutes
creating incentive programs. Requiring a business to post bonds in
the amounts of the incentives granted would also create
accountability for the business and protect state and local
governments. Any restriction of the granting of incentives,
accountability standards or the posting of bonds must be nationwide
standards applied by all state and local governments to be effective.
Without a national standard of accountability, state and local
governments that implemented them would be at a competitive
disadvantage to other state and local governments. Businesses would
simply avoid the accountability standards by expanding or relocating
in those jurisdictions without the standards.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the risks of inefficiencies and accountability, state and
local governments should continue to use economic incentives to
attract business to their jurisdiction to increase job creation and
private capital investment. However, the cost of these incentives, both
in expenditures and forgone tax revenue, represents a growing
portion of state governments' budgets and may subject the state to
steep budget deficits if the incentives do not produce net economic
growth. There is a need for state and local governments to account
for the cost of these incentives and to measure their effectiveness. To
measure effectiveness, state and local governments must be able to
collect reliable information on the cost of incentives, institute
mechanisms to limit or cap the costs of incentives, and hold
businesses accountable for compliance of performance covenants
made in incentive agreements. The collection of reliable information
to measure the effectiveness of economic incentives will require
public availability of data and guidelines on maintaining the data. To
149. See Morgan, supra note 126, at 28.
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limit costs of incentives, limits and caps on funding, annual reviews of
funding, and direct appropriation of funding of incentives should be
connected to state or local government budgets. Lastly, placing the
burden of compliance of incentive agreements on businesses will help
save unnecessary expenditures and forgone tax revenue of state and
local governments.

